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On January 28, 2009, the US House of Representatives passed 
its economic stimulus plan, the American Recovery and Rein-
vestment Act of 2009. Out of the bill’s 700 text pages, a small 
half-page  section    attracted  enormous  media  attention:  the 
section requiring that all public projects funded by the stimulus 
plan must use only iron and steel produced in the United States 
(box 1). Another provision, which drew less attention, extends 
the so-called Berry Amendment (an old Buy American provi-
sion) to uniforms purchased by the Department of Homeland 
Security.1 
The US Senate is currently debating its own version of the 
bill. The Senate draft includes a broad Buy American provision 
that goes further than the House bill, expanding the requirement 
to all manufacturing products (box 2). 
Three sets of issues arise from the Buy American provisions 
of  each  bill:  US  jobs,  US  trade  obligations,  and  US  foreign 
policy. The first section of this policy brief estimates how Buy 
American provisions will add or subtract US jobs. The second 
section provides a legal analysis of the provisions and spells out 
violations of trading rules agreed in the World Trade Organi-
zation  (WTO)  and  the  North  American  Free  Trade  Agree-
ment (NAFTA). The third section evaluates the foreign policy 
1. The Berry Amendment, which previously applied only to the Department of 
Defense, requires that military clothing and other textiles be purchased only from 
US textile and apparel firms.
implications. The policy brief concludes with recommendations 
designed to ensure respect for US international obligations.
Job EffEcts
The House Bill
Steel  is  crucial  to  modern  economies.  Buildings,  automobiles, 
pipelines, and bridges are all made of steel. However, steel manu-
facturing is highly capital intensive, so the labor force employed 
in the industry is deceptively small. About 150,000 workers are 
employed in the US steel industry (North American Industrial 
Classification System Codes 3311 and 3312). 
The key selling point for Buy American legislation is job 
creation. Put bluntly, it is asserted that “not one dollar of the 
stimulus plan should be spent on foreign steel.” In a time of 
crisis, this is a powerful argument. Blue- and white-collar jobs 
alike are being shed at a terrifying pace. The steel industry is 
no  exception.  Even  before  the  financial  crisis,  the  Bureau  of 
Labor Statistics predicted that employment in the steel industry 
would decrease by 25 percent between 2006 and 2016. With 
the crisis, the drop will come much sooner. US steel shipments 
plunged almost 40 percent in November 2008, year-on-year, 
and  25  percent  of  that  decrease  happened  between  October 
and November 2008.2 As the automobile sector collapsed, steel 
producers lost a large volume of sales. To compensate, the US 
steel industry hopes that strong Buy American provisions will 
lock in a stable customer, namely the US public sector.
Table 1 (on page 4) walks through our calculation of the 
positive impact on steel industry jobs of the House provisions 
requiring American iron and steel. We estimate that the addi-
tional US steel production fostered by the Buy American provi-
sions will amount to around 0.5 million metric tons. This in 
turn translates into a gain in steel industry employment equal 
to roughly 1,000 jobs. To repeat a point made earlier: The job 
impact is small because steel is very capital intensive. In the giant 
US economy, with a labor force of roughly 140 million people, 
1,000 jobs more or less is a very small number. 
2. “November Steel Shipments Down 39.9 Percent from Last Year,” press release, 
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The Senate Bill
The draft Senate bill stipulates that, in addition to steel and 
iron, all manufactured goods used in projects financed by the 
stimulus plan must be produced in the United States. We use 
data developed by Christina Romer and Jared Bernstein to 
estimate the job impact of this larger constraint.3 
Romer and Bernstein indicate that the stimulus plan will 
directly create 1.5 million jobs in the US economy. Beyond 
the direct impact, still more jobs will be created as newly hired 
workers spend their wages. For calculating the effect of Buy 
American, however, we ignore this “indirect” effect since there 
is no requirement that wages earned by newly hired workers 
be spent on purchasing American products. 
Of the direct jobs—those affected by the Buy American 
provisions—approximately 220,000 will be in the manufac-
turing industry. Table 2 (on page 5) indicates the spending 
components of the stimulus bill that contribute to creating 
these new jobs. According to the Office of Federal Procure-
3. Christina Romer and Jared Bernstein, “The Job Impact of the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Plan,” January 9, 2009. 
ment Policy,4 around 4 percent of US federal spending for 
the procurement of manufactures used in the United States is 
spent on manufactured goods originating from foreign coun-
tries. We assume that roughly the same percentage applies to 
state procurement of manufactured goods. Thus, as a maxi-
mum effect of the Buy American provision of the Senate bill, 
there might be a switch of this “normal” 4 percent foreign 
purchases to domestic firms. Four percent of 220,000 jobs 
indicates a job gain of roughly 9,000 jobs. A recent report 
on job benefits from infrastructure spending, by the Politi-
cal Economy Research Institute (PERI) and the Alliance for 
American Manufacturing, when correctly evaluated, reaches 
similar results.5
In response to the Buy American measures, other countries 
4. Based on calculations from the Federal Procurement Data System, available 
at www.fpds.gov (accessed on January 31, 2009).
5. James Heintz, Robert Pollin, and Heidi Garrett-Peltier, “How Infrastructure 
Investments Support the US Economy: Employment, Productivity and 
Growth,” Political Economy Research Institute and the Alliance for American 
Manufacturing, January 2009. The study covers direct, indirect, and induced 
job creation; its “upper-bound estimates” of 77,000 US job gains assume no 
imports of any kind, infrastructure spending almost twice as high as in the 
current stimulus bill, and no potential US job losses due to foreign emulation 
or retaliation.
Box 1     HR 1 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009
Status: 1/8/009 Passed/agreed to in House. On passage: Passed by the Yeas and Nays: 44–188 (Roll no. 46).
SEC. 1110. USE OF AMERICAN IRON AND STEEL
(a) In General—None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available by this Act may be used for a project for the 
construction, alteration, maintenance, or repair of a public building or public work unless all of the iron and steel used in the 
project is produced in the United States.
(b) Exceptions—Subsection (a) shall not apply in any case in which the head of the Federal department or agency involved 
finds that—
(1) applying subsection (a) would be inconsistent with the public interest;
() iron and steel are not produced in the United States in sufficient and reasonably available quantities and of a  
  satisfactory quality; or
(3) inclusion of iron and steel produced in the United States will increase the cost of the overall project by more than  
  5 percent.
(c) Written Justification for Waiver—If the head of a Federal department or agency determines that it is necessary to waive 
the application of subsection (a) based on a finding under subsection (b), the head of the department or agency shall pub-
lish in the Federal Register a detailed written justification as to why the provision is being waived.
(d) Definitions—In this section, the terms ‘public building’ and ‘public work’ have the meanings given such terms in section 1 
of the Buy American Act (41 U.S.C. 10c) and include airports, bridges, canals, dams, dikes, pipelines, railroads, multiline mass 
transit systems, roads, tunnels, harbors, and piers.
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would likely choose to echo US legislation by further restrict-
ing the ability of foreign firms to bid on public contracts. 
Such  action—applied  to  lucrative  new  projects  covered  by 
their own stimulus programs—would raise additional barri-
ers to US manufactured exports. Fred Smith, chairman and 
CEO of Federal Express, said “if the Congress passes this Buy 
American provision, I can assure you—and we operate in 220-
some-odd countries around the world and are a huge part of 
the import-export infrastructure of the United States—we will 
get retaliation and it will be American jobs at risk.”6 
If, for example, trading partners strike back with their 
own protectionist measures on steel, the US steel industry 
could  lose  exports.  The  United  States  exported  around  9 
million tons of steel in 2007. Conceivably, the risk to US steel 
exports is equal to or greater than potential production gains 
from the Buy American provision in the House bill. 
Moreover, foreign countries might extend their retaliation 
list to other US manufactured goods, especially if the Senate 
version of Buy American provision becomes law, since it covers 
6. “Canada Blasts Buy American Provisions as Industry Opposition Grows,” 
Inside US Trade, February 2, 2009. 
all manufactured goods. In particular, foreign countries might 
cut off purchases of US products for public projects.
To scope out this possibility, we identify 12 major US 
trading  partners.7  Table  3  (on  page  6)  shows  government 
procurement spending in each of those countries as a percent 
of GDP. Applying that proportion to US exports of goods 
and services to each country, we estimate what share of those 
countries’ direct and indirect imports of US goods and services 
are the result of government procurement.8 The total value is 
around $104 billion. In our view, at least a small share of those 
exports are “at risk” of echo or retaliation measures.9 But even 
7. Australia, Canada, China, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Italy, Japan, 
Korea, the Netherlands, Singapore and the United Kingdom. Comparable 
data for Mexico are not available.
8. Our estimate of US exports procured by foreign governments ($104 billion) 
in table 3 and our estimate of jobs connected to US exports (6,192 per $1 
billion of US exports) in table 4 suggest that roughly 646,000 US jobs are 
supported directly and indirectly by foreign government procurement of US 
exports. For a number of reasons, this is a very crude estimate.  Moreover we 
suggest that only a small fraction of supported jobs would be lost in the event 
of echo behavior or retaliation abroad.
9. Table 5 and appendix 1 show the categories of “at risk” exports and their trade 
values. Of US exports “at risk,” heavy manufacturing exports are most likely to 
Box 2    S 336 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009
Status: Introduced in Senate on January 7, 009
BUY AMERICAN
SEC. 1604. USE OF AMERICAN IRON, STEEL, AND MANUFACTURED GOODS
(a) None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available by this Act may be used for a project for the construction, 
alteration, maintenance, or repair of a public building or public work unless all of the iron, steel, and manufactured goods 
used in the project are produced in the United States. 
(b) Subsection (a) shall not apply in any case in which the head of the Federal department or agency involved finds that—
(1) applying subsection (a) would be inconsistent with the public interest;
() iron, steel, and the relevant manufactured goods are not produced in the United States if sufficient and reasonably  
  available quantities and of a satisfactory quality; or
(3) inclusion of iron, steel, and manufactured goods produced in the United States will  increase the cost of the overall  
  project by more than 5 percent.
(c) If the head of a Federal department or agency determines that it is necessary to waive the application of subsection 
(a) based on a finding under subsection (b) the head of the department or agency shall publish in the Federal Register a 
detailed written jurisdiction as to why the provision is being waived.
(d) In this section, the terms ‘public building’ and ‘public work’ have the meanings given such terms in section 1 of the Buy 
American Act (41 U.S.C. 10c) and include airports, bridges, canals, dams, dikes, pipelines, railroads, multiline mass transit 
systems, roads, tunnels, harbors, and piers.
Source: Extracted from the text of the bill available at http://thomas.loc.gov.N u m b e r   Pb0 9 - 2     f e b r u a r y   2 0 0 9
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if 1 percent of those exports were in fact lost by echo or retali-
ation behavior, the resulting employment loss in the United 
States would be around 6,500 jobs. In an extreme case that 10 
percent of those exports are lost, as many as 65,000 jobs could 
vanish (table 4). 
To summarize: The negative job impact of foreign retali-
ation against Buy American provisions could easily outweigh 
the positive effect of the measures on jobs in the US iron and 
steel sector and other industries. The difference is that jobs lost 
would be spread across the entire manufacturing sector, while 
jobs gained would be concentrated in iron and steel and a few 
other industries. 
Other factors not reflected in our calculations could also 
have a negative impact on net job creation. For example, with 
a Buy American requirement, the prices charged to public 
agencies would likely be higher for US iron and steel and 
other  manufactured  products.  Higher  prices  would  mean 
be affected by discriminatory foreign government procurement policies.
that fewer roads and schools could be built with the stimulus 
money. Higher iron and steel prices could also hurt steel-using 
firms that are major US exporters—such as heavy machinery. 
On the other hand, prices might fall for foreign steel sold by 
countries where the steel industry depends on exports to the 
United States, such as Mexico and Canada. Private US buyers 
might in turn switch their purchases to those foreign produc-
ers. Depending on the size of the switch, the jobs created by 
the Buy American provisions could be significantly reduced by 
a loss of sales to private business in the United States. 
IntErnatIonal oblIgatIons
While the texts of Buy American provisions included in the 
House (HR 1) and Senate (S 336) bills are very similar, the 
Senate  version  expands  the  Buy  American  initiative  from 
Table 1     Estimate of positive job impact of House American iron and steel provisions
Item Estimate 
US employment in the steel industry, 006 (thousands) 154.3
US production of crude steel, 006 (million metric tons [mmt]) 98.6
US imports of steel, 006 (mmt) 41.7
Employees (thousands) per mmt of crude steel production (154.3/98.6) 1.6
Additional steel purchases (mmt) from House American iron and steel provisions, if applied to all  
   government purchases of steel (see below)
0.5
Additional steel employees (thousands) from House American iron and steel provisions policy, if applied to 
    all government purchases of steel (1.6 x 0.5)
0.7
Memorandum:  Derivation of additional steel purchases estimate
Federal government procurement as a share of US manufacturing output (percent)a 6.9
Federal and state government procurement as a share of US manufacturing output (percent)b 11.0
Total steel consumption in the United States, 007 (mmt) 108.
Federal and state government steel consumption, 007 (mmt) (11 percent x 108.) 11.9
Federal government procurement of foreign-manufactured goods as a share of total procurement of 
   manufactured goods (percent)c
4.0
Estimated federal and state government purchase of foreign steel (mmt) (4 percent x 11.9) 0.5
a. This rate is determined as the share of federal procurement in manufacturing in 007 ($158.4 billion) divided by valued added in manufacturing 
006 ($,85.9 billion). 
b. This rate is determine by scaling the 6.9 percent rate by a factor of 1.6, which is determined by the ratio of federal plus state 007 budget out-
lays ($4,419.1 billion) to federal outlays ($,784.3 billion). 
c. This rate is determined as 007 government purchases of imported manufactures ($5.8 billion) divided by total government manufactures 
purchases ($153. billion). The latter figure differs slightly from the comparable figure used in note (a) because of different government reporting 
requirements.
Sources: International Iron and Steel Institute, World Steel in Figures, 008; Bureau of Labor Statistics, 009; Bureau of Economic Analysis, 009; 
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iron and steel to cover all manufactured goods.10 These provi-
sions go far beyond the scope of US exceptions in either the 
WTO  Agreement  on  Government  Procurement  (GPA)  or 
the procurement chapter of NAFTA. In other words, if the 
Buy American provisions are applied to signatory parties of 
the GPA or to NAFTA partners (Mexico and Canada), they 
would violate US obligations. The European Union is already 
examining the provisions to build a legal case for a WTO 
complaint.11 
The WTO Agreement on Government Procurement 
The  GPA  was  negotiated  during  the  Uruguay  Round  and 
entered into force on January 1, 1996. Current members of the 
GPA are Canada, the 27 member states of European Commu-
10. The texts of the House and Senate bills are available at http://thomas.loc.
gov. 
11. Doug Palmer, “White House Reviewing Buy American Plan,” Reuters, 
January 30, 2009.
nities, Hong Kong, Iceland, Israel, Japan, Korea, Liechtenstein, 
the Netherlands with respect to Aruba, Norway, Singapore, 
Switzerland, and the United States. The point of the GPA is 
to open procurement to competition from firms based in the 
signatory countries—but not to firms based in other WTO 
members such as Brazil, China, India, Mexico, and Russia.12 
Those five countries account for around 40 percent of US iron 
and steel imports in 2006 (table 6). Some GPA member coun-
tries had previously opened government procurement bilater-
ally (see appendix 2); the agreement locked in that progress.
Article I: 1 of the GPA defines the scope and coverage. 
It  states:  “This  Agreement  applies  to  any  law,  regulation, 
procedure or practice regarding any procurement by entities 
covered by this Agreement, as specified in Appendix I.” Pursu-
ant to this article, parties have submitted their lists of covered 
entities. Those entities include central governmental entities 
as well as some subcentral governmental entities and public 
agencies. 
While  US  commitments  under  the  GPA  cover  many 
federal government entities and 37 states, the proponents of 
Buy American provisions argue that a large portion of the 
projects funded by the stimulus bills are not covered in the 
GPA.13 For example, there is a general exclusion for federal 
funds destined for mass transit and highway projects.14 More-
over, many of the 37 states that acceded to the GPA also 
reserved sensitive procurement areas, such as motor vehicles, 
construction-grade steel, and construction services. But not all 
states made these reservations. For example, California did not 
exclude construction-grade steel and motor vehicles from its 
GPA commitments. In the absence of a reservation or exemp-
tion, the application of Buy American provisions to projects 
sponsored by entities covered in the GPA would violate US 
obligations.
12. Unlike other WTO accords, GPA obligations are not extended to all 
WTO members under the most favored nation principle. 
13. “Industries Clash Over ‘Buy American’ Provisions in Stimulus Package,” 
Inside US Trade 27, no.4, January 30, 2009. 
14. Note 5 of Annex 2, which lists the covered 37 states and subfederal bodies, 
states: “the agreement shall not apply to restrictions attached to Federal funds 
for mass transit and highway projects.” See Annex 2 of the United States to the 
GPA (available at www.wto.org).
Table 2     Positive job impact of Senate Buy American  











Import share of US federal manufacturing 
purchases in 007 (percent)a
4.0
Estimated increase in manufacturing employ-
ment due to the Senate Buy American provi-
sion (4 percent x 19.9)a
8.8
Note: The table shows manufacturing jobs created directly from the 
spending components of the American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Plan. The impact is estimated by applying the ratio of direct jobs to total 
jobs for the spending components of the recovery package (Romer and 
Bernstein 009, table ) to total manufacturing jobs created (Romer and 
Bernstein 009, table 4).
a. Based on calculations from the Federal Procurement Data System, 
available at www.fpds.gov (accessed on January 31, 009). 
Sources: Christina Romer and Jared Bernstein, “The Job Impact of the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Plan,” January 9, 009;  authors’ 
calculations.
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services as a 
share of GDP 
(percent)b
US exports 
of goods and 
services  







(billions of US 
dollars)
Canada 8 69 1
United Kingdom 1 97 11
Japana 3 95 3
Germany 4 6 3
China (mainland)a 16 51 8
Netherlands 7 41 3
Koreaa 4 38 
France 5 38 
Singaporea 5 6 1
Australia 6 6 
Hong Konga 4 1 1
Italy 5 0 1
Subtotal 785 58
Total world trade, 006 (billions of US dollars)c 1,43 104
Sample country share of total (percent) 55 55
a. 005 figures. 
b. For EU countries and India, “government use of goods and services” is the description. 
c. The total reflects 005 exports to Japan, China, Korea, Singapore, and Hong Kong. 
d. US exports are calculated as government purchases of goods and services as a share of GDP times total US exports to the 
country. By assumption, government purchases as a share of GDP roughly equals direct and indirect government purchases as 
a share of US exports to the country.
Sources: International Monetary Fund, Government Finance Statistics, 007, and World Economic Outlook, 008; authors’ 
calculations.
Table 4     Negative job impact of discriminatory foreign government procurement
Percent of exports 
“at risk” 
Estimated US 
exportsa (billions of US 
dollars)
Lost exports 
(billions of US dollars)
American jobs lostb 
(thousands of 
employees)
1 104 1.0 6.5
5 104 5. 3.3
10 104 10.4 64.7
a. See table 3.
b. Based on an estimated coefficient of 6,19 workers per every billion dollars of US exports of manufactured 
goods. This estimate is derived from 14,155,000 manufacturing workers in 006 divided by $,85.9 billion of 
value added in manufacturing in 006.
Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics, 009; Bureau of Economic Analysis, 009; US Census Bureau, 009.N u m b e r   Pb0 9 - 2                                                                                                          f e b r u a r y   2 0 0 9
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The North American Free Trade Agreement
On January 1, 1994, the North American Free Trade Agreement 
entered into force in the three signatory countries, the United 
States, Canada, and Mexico. Chapter 10 of NAFTA contains 
government  procurement  obligations  and  covers  almost  all 
federal government agencies in the three countries, as well as 
many  government-controlled  enterprises.  US  commitments 
under NAFTA cover a much larger share of federal procure-
ment than the GPA. Unlike in the GPA, NAFTA Chapter 
10 does not cover state and provincial government entities.15 
Therefore, some argue that federal funds given to state and 
local  governments  for  infrastructure  projects  would  not 
violate the procurement obligations under the NAFTA. This 
is too clever. If the federal government provided a block grant 
with no conditions to the states—which then decided what to 
spend it on—it would clearly be state procurement. However, 
when the federal government hands money to the states to 
be used in ways that are spelled out in detail—including Buy 
American provisions—it is a different story. In a state-to-state 
15. See Chapter 10 of the text of the NAFTA available at www.nafta-sec-alena.
org. 
arbitration  proceeding  under  NAFTA,  impartial  arbitrators 
would very likely conclude that it is federal procurement and 
that NAFTA obligations apply. 
Waiver Clauses
The  Buy  American  provisions  of  both  House  and  Senate 
versions (see boxes 1 and 2) include waiver clauses. Subsection 
(b) of Section 1110 in the House version of the bill states: 
(b) Exceptions—Subsection (a) shall not apply in any 
case in which the head of the Federal department or 
agency  involved  finds  that—(1)  applying  subsection 
(a) would be inconsistent with the public interest; (2) 
iron and steel are not produced in the United States in 
sufficient and reasonably available quantities and of a 
satisfactory quality; or (3) inclusion of iron and steel 
produced in the United States will increase the cost of 
the overall project by more than 25 percent.
The Senate version is almost identical but adds “relevant 
manufactured goods” to iron and steel. 
By invoking the public interest exception, the United States 
could avoid a violation of its international obligations. But unless 
the final legislation explicitly waives the Buy American restric-
tions for foreign suppliers covered by US trade obligations, or the 
waiver is invoked publicly by President Barack Obama on the day 
he signs the bill, the damage will be done. Foreign countries will 
not wait for determinations by agency heads. They will conclude 
that the United States intends to ignore its obligations. In turn, 
they will map out their own echo and retaliation strategies. 
Us forEIgn rElatIons
A focus on domestic needs in time of crisis is normal. But Buy 
American provisions, unless waived, will violate US obliga-
tions to the international community. Therefore, it is impor-
tant to consider the foreign policy implications. 
The most immediate risk is an echo or retaliation, already 
discussed. The much bigger cost is the damage to US reputa-
tion. In a stroke, the United States would forfeit the moral 
high  ground  when  it  comes  to  slowing  the  protectionist 
juggernaut that now threatens the world economy. Enacting 
Buy American requirements would open the door for coun-
tries worldwide to walk away from their trade obligations—or 
simply to raise barriers where they have no obligations. EU 
spokesman Peter Power stated that “if a bill is passed which 
prohibits the sale or purchase of European goods on American 
territory, [the European Union] will not stand idly by and 
Table 5     US heavy manufacturing exports to major    
  partners:  Goods “vulnerable” to  
  discriminatory foreign government  
  procurement policies, 2006  

















Note: “Vulnerable” products are listed in appendix 1. The estimates here 
are comparable to the “at-risk” estimates listed in table 3; however, the 
methodologies differ.
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ignore.”16 Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper expressed 
his own grave concern about the measure.17 
If echoes and retaliation multiply, the world could be faced 
with rising protection, reminiscent of the Great Depression. 
The Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, which raised tariffs on 
some 20,000 goods, ignited retaliation from US trading part-
ners—and served as a catalyst for turning the depression into 
the Great Depression. Even a small echo of that experience 
would be a disaster. 
Buy American provisions would particularly damage US 
reputation abroad since they would come just a few months 
after the United States pledged to reject protectionism at the 
G-20 summit on November 15, 2008.18 The world is carefully 
watching the first moves of President Obama to gauge the 
tone of the new administration’s trade policy. Buy American 
provisions are an early test. The need for the stimulus bill is 
urgent, both economically and politically, and the administra-
tion has worked hard to enact the measure. Unless recast or 
waived, however, Buy American provisions will be read as an 
Obama trade policy that leans toward protectionism—with 
severe consequences abroad.
conclUsIon
Based on our economic and legal analysis, the Buy American 
provisions would violate US trade obligations and damage the 
United States’ reputation, with very little impact on US jobs. In 
a country of 140 million workers, with millions of new jobs to 
be created by the stimulus package, the number of employees 
affected by the Buy American provision is a rounding error. 
In other words, there is little bang for the buck, and on 
balance the Buy American provisions could well cost jobs if 
other countries emulate US policies. Most importantly, the 
Buy American provisions contradict the G-20 commitment 
not to implement new protectionist measures—a commitment 
that was designed to forestall a rush of “beggar-thy-neighbor” 
policies. 
What should be done? The best result would be to simply 
delete  the  Buy  American  provision  in  the  House-Senate 
16. Wendell Goler, “‘Buy American’ Rule in Stimulus Bill Sparks Protest,” 
FoxNews.com, January 30, 2009.
17. “Canadian Steel Industry has ‘Grave Concerns’ about US Protectionism,” 
The Canadian Press, January 29, 2009. 
18. “We underscore the critical importance of rejecting protectionism and not 
turning inward in times of financial uncertainty. In this regard, within the next 
12 months, we will refrain from raising new barriers to investment or to trade 
in goods and services, imposing new export restrictions, or implementing 
World Trade Organization (WTO) inconsistent measures to stimulate exports” 
(Declaration of the Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy, 
G-20, November 15, 2008, Washington).
conference.  Existing  laws  already  provide  Buy  American 
preferences for much of the public procurement authorized 
in the stimulus bill, though the rule does not always require 
100 percent US content as in the current draft bills. However, 
given the legislative history of the stimulus bill, and the politi-
cally salient argument that US funds should support only US 
jobs, the deletion option would raise hackles.
Next best would be to keep the House version, apply-
ing the Buy American restriction only to iron and steel, but 
stating explicitly—in either the statutory text or in the legis-
lative history—that the public interest waiver is intended to 
be used to avoid violations of US trade obligations. Under 
this option, Canada and Mexico would be exempted due to 
NAFTA’s broad obligations regarding federal procurement, as 
would GPA signatories, but the restrictions would bar the use 
of imported iron and steel from key suppliers such as China, 
India,  and  Brazil.  Consequently,  it  would  likely  encourage 
those countries to adopt comparable policies that discriminate 
against US suppliers for their own public procurement and 
complicate US efforts to work cooperatively to resolve the 
global financial crisis.
The third option is a presidential statement—preferably 
before  legislation  is  finalized—that  the  United  States  will 
respect its international obligations when it applies the Buy 
American  provisions.  In  other  words,  at  the  starting  gate, 
President Obama should send a clear signal that he will invoke 
the public interest waiver to waive Buy American provisions 
for GPA and NAFTA signatories. Clearly a global trade war is 
against the public interest. Moreover, President Obama should 
extend an invitation to countries that are not already members 
of  the WTO  GPA  to  sign  up  and  thus  receive  equivalent 
treatment. 
The  United  States  leads  by  example,  and  it  would  be 
unfortunate if the first major trade policy action under the 
Obama administration bowed to protectionist pressures and 
violated international obligations. That would jolt US rela-
The Buy American provisions contradict the 
G-20 commitment not to implement new 
protectionist measures—a commitment 
that was designed to forestall a rush 
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tions with Canada and Mexico, just when we need to work 
more closely with them on important issues such as climate 
change and border security and just before President Obama’s 
visit to Canada on February 19. It would dampen prospects 
for  action  by  the  G-20  summit  in  London  on  April  2  to 
forestall protectionist measures worldwide and to revive the 
Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations. Why take on 
these risks when the Buy American provisions do little to help 
American workers?  
The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors. This publication is part of the overall program 
of the Institute,as endorsed by its Board of Directors, but does not necessarily reflect the views of individual 
members of the Board or the Advisory Committee.
Table 6     US imports of HS 72 (iron and steel) and HS 73 (articles of iron and 
  steel) from GPA members, BRIC, and Mexico, 2006
Country
Value 























GPA and non-GPA subtotal 5,761 53.57
World 60,350 65.61
GPA = Government Procurement Agreement 
BRIC = Brazil, Russia, India, and China 
HS = Harmonized System
Note: The total imports figure listed in this table differs from the comparable import figure listed in table 1 
because that figure does not include all of HS 7 and HS 73 imports.
Sources: UN Comtrade database, 009; Taiwan figures: USITC Interactive Tariff and Trade Dataweb, 009.N u m b e r   Pb0 9 - 2     f e b r u a r y   2 0 0 9
10
appEndIx 1     prodUcts sUscEptIblE to dIscrImInatory forEIgn govErnmEnt procUrEmEnt polIcIEs
Harmonized 
System Code Description
8406 Steam turbines and other vapor turbines, and parts thereof
8407 Spark-ignition reciprocating or rotary internal combustion piston engines
8408 Compression-ignition internal combustion piston engines (diesel or semi-diesel engines)
8409 Parts for spark-ignition reciprocating or rotary internal combustion piston engines and compression-ignition internal combustion 
piston engines
8410 Hydraulic turbines, water wheels and regulators thereof; parts thereof
8411 Turbojets, turbopropellers and other gas turbines, and parts thereof
841 Engines and motors nesoi, and parts thereof
840 Calendering or other rolling machines, other than for metals or glass, and cylinders thereof; parts thereof
841 Centrifuges, including centrifugal dryers; filtering or purifying machinery and apparatus, for liquids or gases; parts thereof
845 Pulley tackle and hoists other than skip hoists; winches and capstans; jacks
846 Ship’s derricks; cranes; mobile lifting frames, straddle carriers and works trucks fitted with a crane
847 Fork-lift trucks; other works trucks fitted with lifting or handling equipment
848 Lifting, handling, loading or unloading machinery (including elevators, escalators and conveyors)
849 Self-propelled bulldozers, angledozers, graders, levelers, scrapers, mechanical shovels, excavators, shovel loaders, tamping machines 
and road rollers
8430 Machinery nesoi, for moving, grading, excavating, boring etc. earth, minerals or ores; pile-drivers and pile-extractors; snowplows and 
snowblowers
8431 Parts of machinery of headings 845 to 8430 covering derricks, fork-lift trucks, conveyers, self-propelled bulldozers, graders, snow 
plows, etc.
8457 Machining centers, unit construction machines and multistation transfer machines, for working metal
8458 Lathes for removing metal, including turning centers
8459 Machine tools, other than lathes, for drilling, boring, milling, threading or tapping by removing metal
8460 Machine tools for deburring, honing or otherwise finishing metal or cermets by means of grinding, abrasive or polishing products, nesoi
8461 Machine tools for planing, shaping, broaching etc., gear cutting, gear finishing etc., and other machine tools working by removing 
metal etc., nesoi
8463 Machine tools for working metal or cermets, without removing metal, nesoi
8464 Machine tools for working stone, ceramics, concrete, asbestos-cement or like mineral materials or for cold working glass
8465 Machine tools for working wood, cork, bone, hard rubber, hard plastics or similar hard materials (including machines for nailing, stapling 
etc.)
8466 Parts and accessories for use with machine tools of headings 8456 to 8465, including work or tool holders and other special 
attachments
848 Ball or roller bearings, and parts thereof
8483 Transmission shafts and cranks; bearing housings, housed bearings etc.; gears and gearing; ball & roller screws; clutches, etc.; and parts
8484 Gaskets and like joints of metal sheet combined with other material or metal layers; assortments of gaskets and like  joints, mechanical 
seals, etc.
8701 Tractors (other than works trucks of heading 8709)
8705 Special purpose motor vehicles, nesoi, including wreckers, mobile cranes, fire fighting vehicles, concrete mixers, mobile workshops, etc.
8706 Chassis fitted with engines for tractors, motor vehicles for passengers, goods transport vehicles and special purpose motor vehicles
8707 Bodies (including cabs) for tractors, public-transport passenger vehicles, motor cars, goods transport vehicles and special purpose 
motor vehicles
8709 Works trucks, self-propelled, not fitted with lifting or handling equipment; tractors used on railway station platforms; parts thereof
8800 Aeroplanes and other aircraft, of an unladen weight not exceeding ,000kg
88830 Aeroplanes and other aircraft, of an unladen weight exceeding ,000kg but not exceeding 15,000kg
88040 Aeroplanes and other aircraft, of an unladen weight exceeding 15,000kg 
nesoi = not elswehere specified or included
Source: US International Trade Commission, Interactive Tariff and Trade Dataweb, 009, http://dataweb.usitc.gov.N u m b e r   Pb0 9 - 2                                                                                                          f e b r u a r y   2 0 0 9
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appEndIx 2     bIlatEral opEnIng of govErnmEnt procUrEmEnt: thE casE of Japan and  
  thE UnItEd statEs
  In the 1980s and 1990s the United States made a major effort 
to open Japanese government procurement and construction 
projects to US firms. After the US Congress threatened retalia-
tory steps if Japan did not open its bidding procedures, the 
United States and Japan reached key agreements. If new US 
Buy American provisions are now imposed, they would under-
mine the philosophy that guided many years of US policy 
toward Japan and other countries. 
Computers.  C.  Fred  Bergsten  and  Marcus  Noland 
(1993) estimated that, in 1990, Japanese computer firms got 
30 percent of their revenues from the government market of 
roughly $9 billion. US and other foreign firms were largely 
excluded, but a market access agreement was negotiated in 
the context of the January 1992 visit by President George H. 
W. Bush to Japan. However, the authors found that “both 
countries’  public  procurement  policies  appear  to  discrimi-
nate against imported supercomputers” in part because of an 
“informal ‘buy American’” policy that existed in 1993 when 
their book was published. 
Construction. A central target of US policy was the Japa-
nese practice of dango, or bid rigging on construction projects. 
In 1989 the US Department of Justice reached a settlement 
with 99 contractors for bid-rigging at the Yokosuka Naval 
Base. “Since 1984, the strategy of the United States has been 
to use the Japanese public works markets as the wedge to 
begin getting US firms into the market (…). This approach 
has the obvious attraction of focusing on the segment of the 
construction market over which the Japanese government has 
the greatest sway and that is most amenable to government-to-
government negotiations.” 
A  key  lever  was  an  amendment  that  Senator  Frank 
Murkowski (R-AK) attached to a budget resolution, passed in 
December 1987, which barred firms of countries not granting 
reciprocal access to US firms from participating in federally 
funded public works. “Japanese observers were shocked when 
the low bid on a Washington, DC, subway project, submitted 
by a joint venture of Kiewit Construction and Kajima Engi-
neering (which had been implicated in the Yokosuka dango 
case), was rejected on the grounds that the Murkowski amend-
ment  barred  the  participation  of  Japanese  firms.”  In  1988 
the United States and Japan reached an understanding (the 
so-called Major Projects Agreement), which established bid 
procedures for Kansai Airport (KIA) and other large projects. 
However, foreign firms continued to encounter difficul-
ties and a big dispute erupted over the rejection of a bid by 
AEG and Westinghouse for a people mover system at KIA. 
The  disputes  escalated  until  1991,  when  Prime  Minister 
Toshiki  Kaifu  agreed  on  a  compromise.  Eventually  14  US 
general contractors obtained licenses to work in Japan, and 
US firms were awarded $375 million in the wake of the 1991 
agreement.
Source:  C. Fred Bergsten and Marcus Noland, Reconcilable Differences? United States–
Japan Economic Conflict (Washington: Institute for International Economics, 1993).